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Testimonial Smothering and Pornography:  
Silencing Refusing Sex and Reporting Assault 
Rosa Vince 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper defends the claim that there are two previously underexplored 
ways in which pornography silences women. These ways that pornography 
silences are (1) the smothering of refusal and (2) the smothering of sexual assault 
reports, and they can be explĂŝŶĞĚŝŶƉĂƌƚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ<ƌŝƐƚŝĞŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨ
 “testimonial smothering. ? Unlike the work of other writers in the pornography as 
silencing literature, my discussion of silenced refusal of sex deals with the cases 
where women have said yes to sex but would have said no if they had felt that 
they could have. I show that this, and cases where women do not report sexual 
assault, count as testimonial smothering through identifying rape myths as a 
species of  “pernicious ignorance. ? I make the connection to pornography in 
presenting evidence that pornography contributes to acceptance of rape myths. 
dŚŝƐƚĂŬĞƐƵƐƚŽŵǇŐĞŶĞƌĂůĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶ PŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶŝĂů
smothering gives us a way in which pornography contributes to the silencing of 
women, by silencing their refusal of sex and their reports of sexual assault. 
 
 
Keywords: silencing, speech, Kristie Dotson, pornography, sexual assault, rape 
myths, refusal 
 
 
 
tŽƌŬŽŶǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƐŝůĞŶĐŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƉŽƌŶŽŐƌĂƉŚǇŚĂƐƐŽĨĂƌfocused 
largely ŽŶZĂĞ>ĂŶŐƚŽŶ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨĨĂŝůĞĚƌĞĨƵƐĂůŽĨƐĞǆ.1,2 This paper defends 
the claim that there are two underexplored ways in which pornography silences 
women. These are (1) the smothering of refusal and (2) the smothering of assault 
reports, and they can be explained in part through Kristie ŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵnt of 
                                                          
1 I will not discuss the influential account of silencing proposed by Langton for 
two reasons. First, it has already been discussed a great deal; see for example 
Jacobson (1995 ? ?ŝƌĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ>ĂŶŐƚŽŶĂŶĚ,ŽƌŶƐďǇ ?Ɛ(2009) responses. 
^ĞĐŽŶĚ ?/ƚŚŝŶŬǁĞĐŽƵůĚďĞŶĞĨŝƚĨƌŽŵĂŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƚŚĂƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƌĞůǇŽŶƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ
ƐƉĞĞĐŚĂĐƚƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ĂƐƚŚĂƚŝƐǁŚĞƌĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐǁŝƚŚ>ĂŶŐƚŽŶ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ
arise.  
2 Influenced by MacKinnon and Dworkin, e.g. MacKinnon (1987) and Dworkin 
(1981). 
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 “testimonial smothering. ?3 My discussion of silenced refusal of sex differs from 
>ĂŶŐƚŽŶ ?Ɛ ?ŝŶƚŚĂƚ/deal with the cases where women in fact say yes to sex, but 
would, if they felt they could, have said no. These are two contexts in which 
women cannot speak that are so widespread that they call for explanation and 
move the debate from the confused ground of  “illocutionary silencing ? to the 
more tangible  “locutionary silencing, ? or  “literally not speaking. ?  
I do not claim testimonial smothering is the sole factor contributing to 
women consenting to unwanted sex and not reporting sexual assault, or that 
pornography is the sole cause of this testimonial smothering. I claim it is 
ƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞƚŚĂƚƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶŝĂůƐŵŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐƉůĂǇƐĂŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƌŽůĞŝŶǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƐŝůĞŶĐĞ
in these two cases and that pornography plays an important role in that 
testimonial smothering. Applying DŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝŶƚŚŝƐǁĂǇŝƐǀĂůƵĂďůĞŝŶ
demonstrating the broad utility of testimonial smothering as a concept, and in 
filling explanatory gaps regarding these two cases of women not speaking, where 
the existing literature is limited.  
This paper is split into four parts. In part 1, I suggest two circumstances in 
ǁŚŝĐŚǁŽŵĞŶĂƌĞƐŝůĞŶĐĞĚ PǁŽŵĞŶŶŽƚƌĞĨƵƐŝŶŐƐĞǆǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚŝƚ ?ĂŶĚ
women not reporting rapes and sexual assaults. In part 2, I explain an account 
from Dotson which describes similar kinds of silencing and categorizes them into 
testimonial quietening and testimonial smothering. In part 3, I apply ŽƚƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
account of testimonial smothering to the silenced refusal of sex, and taking into 
account ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐƐƚƵĚŝĞƐŝŶƚŽǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƐƉĞĂŬŝŶƚŚĞƐĞcircumstances, I 
demonstrate that pornography contributes to this silencing. In part 4, I apply 
ŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐǁŽƌŬƚŽƐŝůĞŶĐĞĚƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇŽĨƌĂƉĞƐĂŶĚƐĞǆƵĂůĂƐƐĂƵůƚƐĂŶĚƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚ
pornography contributes in much the same way.  
I do not commit to any particular definition of pornography. My 
arguments will hold under most definitions. They certainly hold under a radical 
feminist definition P “ƚŚĞŐƌĂƉŚŝĐ, sexually explicit subordination of women 
through pictures ŽƌǁŽƌĚƐ ? (MacKinnon 1987, 176). They will also hold under an 
everyday definition, such as  “sexually explicit material aimed at arousing the 
viewer, ? as long as most pornography is also oppressive and furthers harmful 
attitudes towards women.4 I do not expect or intend my arguments to hold 
against feminist pornography or  “erotica, ?5 or against pornography under an 
                                                          
3 In a surprising and encouraging instance of two people independently and 
simultaneously drawing the same conclusions, a similar argument to this is made 
in Beecroft (unpublished).  
4 I am not assuming this; I spend the end of part 3 arguing that typical 
pornography does further harmful attitudes towards women.  
5 Some feminists use this term for nonoppressive sexually explicit material aimed 
at arousal. 
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everyday definition in a possible world where oppressive and harmful 
pornography is uncommon.6  
Whilst the area I am entering tends to treat pornography as speech, my 
discussion does not require commitment to this position.7 The consequence is 
simply that where I think of  “pornography that silences, ? some will think of 
 “speech that silences. ?  
Finally, I wish to make it clear that I will make no prescriptions in this 
paper as to what should be done about the problem of silencing. I leave it as an 
opportunity for other writers and researchers to discuss whether pornography 
can and should be restricted in order to minimize its silencing of women. I only 
show that pornography does contribute to the silencing of women in certain 
ways, though I do make the more modest claim that with this kind of silencing 
explained, we are in a better position to next establish what might be required in 
solving the problem. 
 
Part 1: Two Failures to Speak 
I suggest there are two very common circumstances in which women fail 
to speak, and that these should be characterized through a silencing account. 
These are: (1) women not refusing, and consenting to, sex that they do not want, 
and (2) women not reporting rape and sexual assault. In J. L. ƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƚĞƌŵƐƚŚĞƐĞ
are both instances of locutionary silencing, as they are not speech acts that failed 
in some way, but rather they are cases where women do not utter at all. 8 This 
means that they are a kind of silencing that all can take seriously, not just those 
ǁŚŽĚĞĨĞŶĚƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚĂĐƚƚŚĞŽƌǇĂŶĚƚŚĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ “illocutionary 
silencing. ? This can help further our understanding of how pornography may 
ƐŝůĞŶĐĞǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƌĞĨƵƐĂůŽĨƐĞǆ ?providing an important alternative to the claims 
Langton makes.  
 
Silenced Refusal of Sex 
Many women do not refuse sex when they do not want it. Muehlenhard 
and Cook (1988, 64) found that 97.5% of women in a university had experienced 
unwanted sexual activity at some point in their lives, 9 and K ?^ƵůůŝǀĂŶĂŶĚůůŐĞŝĞƌ 
                                                          
6 /ŵĞĂŶƚŽŝŵƉůǇŚĞƌĞƚŚĂƚ/ĂŵŶŽƚ “ĂŶƚŝ-ƉŽƌŶŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŵǇĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ
in this paper do not conflict with my pro-sex worker commitments; I am simply 
pointing to some ways that the pornography industry currently contributes to 
harms to women. These harms are not necessarily intrinsic to pornography.  
7 For an excellent case against pornography being speech, and analysis of the 
related subordination debate, see Saul (2006). 
8 Or, as in some cases, they do not utter refusal at all ? they utter consent.  
9 In this study 507 men and 486 women filled in an anonymous questionnaire in 
a room with other respondents (seated at alternating desks to avoid being 
influenced by others) and a research assistant, all of the same gender.  
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(1998, 239) reported that 50% of women (compared to 26% of men) in 
relationships had consented10 to unwanted sexual activity with their partner in 
the last fortnight.11 In most studies, men who had unwanted sexual activity most 
often reported peer pressure as their reason for consenting,12,13 whereas women 
more often consented out of fear or a sense of duty. Koss and Oros (1982, 456) 
found that 32.8% of 2,016 women students had unwanted sex because they 
feared that refusal was pointless as the man would be unable to stop.14 In 
Muehlenhard and Cook (1988, 65), 56.6% of women reported having unwanted 
sex because they feared the man would terminate the relationship if they did not 
consent. Sandberg, Jackson and Petretic-Jackson found that 63% of women had 
unwanted sexual activity because they  “ĨĞůƚ it would be inappropriate to refuse, ?
ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞ ? ?A?ŽĨƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǁŽŵĞŶƐĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞ “ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇĐŽŵĨŽƌƚĂďůĞ
ƐĂǇŝŶŐŶŽƚŽƐĞǆƵĂůĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇǁŝƚŚĂĚĂƚŝŶŐƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ ? (quoted in Walker 1997, 158). 
Shotland and Hunter (1995, 232) showed that 67% of women consented to 
unwanted sex because, as one woman said of her partner,  “/ĚŝĚŶŽƚǁĂŶƚƚŽ
ĚŝƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŚŝŵ ?; this was the most common reason given in this study.15 Impett 
and Peplau (2002) reported similar findings, but additionally observed racial 
differences in results: while around two-thirds of all women in the study had 
consented to unwanted sex, 100% of the African American women in the study 
had done so. Though there is not space to cover it here, this shows that there is 
scope to address unwanted sex as a problem that not only disproportionately 
affects certain genders but also disproportionately affects certain races.16 I have 
                                                          
10 I do not mean to suggest that nonrefusal and consent are equivalent; I mean 
to be talking about cases where women do not refuse, and in addition they may 
consent.  
11 In this study, 80 men and 80 women who were in relationships kept diaries of 
their sexual activities for two weeks. 
12 The exception is Muehlenhard and Cook (1988), who present the broadly 
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĞĚ “ĞŶƚŝĐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚďŝǌĂƌƌĞůǇŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ “ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶ
ƚƵƌŶĞĚǇŽƵŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚĐŽŵŵŽŶƌĞĂƐŽŶŵĞŶĞŶŐĂŐĞŝŶƵŶǁĂŶƚĞĚ
sexual actŝǀŝƚǇ ?dŚĞǇĚŝĚŚŽǁĞǀĞƌƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ “ŝŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐĞĞŵƐƚŽŵĞĂ
ƐǇŵƉƚŽŵŽĨƉĞĞƌƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞĂŶǇǁĂǇ ?ĂŶĚ “ƉĞĞƌƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐŚŽǁĞĚ ? ? ? ?A?
and 52.1% of men in engaging in unwanted sex for those reasons respectively.  
13 Notice this implies the pressure comes from other men. 
14 This study involved 3,862 students completing a survey on their sexual 
experiences.  
15 In this study, 378 women students responded to a questionnaire asking how 
many times they had participated in certain sexual practices and why.  
16 dŚŝƐĐŽƵůĚďĞĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽďǇŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐĨŝƌƐƚŬŝŶĚŽĨƐŝůĞŶĐŝŶŐ ?ƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶŝĂů
quietening, which demonstrates that black voices are taken less seriously than 
white voices. 
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shown here that women often do not voice refusal when they do not want to 
have sex, and that this is often because of fear or a sense of duty.  
It may be objected that the cases in which a woman says yes and where a 
woman says nothing are very different cases. And they certainly are.17 However, 
as we will see, this does not mean there are different kinds of silencing at work. 
In both cases, a woman wants to say no, and that  “no ? is smothered for the kinds 
of reasons mentioned. This will not mean, as could be objected, that any speech 
that is not what the speaker would have preferred to say counts as this kind of 
silencing, because there are still three circumstances for testimonial smothering 
that need to be met, as we will see in part 2. 
 
Silenced Reports of Assault 
It is difficult to establish how many women do not report rape, precisely 
because they do not report it. Some women who do not report rape to the police 
may still repŽƌƚŝƚŝŶƐƚƵĚŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŽǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĐƌŝƐŝƐĐĞŶƚƌĞƐ ?ďƵƚŝƚŝƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŚĂƚ
ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŵĂŶǇǁŽŵĞŶǁŚŽũƵƐƚĚŽŶ ?ƚƚĞůůĂŶǇŽŶĞ ?Still we can gather 
information from studies and crisis centres, though we should be aware of the 
fact that we are potentially missing out huge numbers of women, and our figures 
for unreported rapes will always be too low. According to RAINN (sexual assault 
prevention charity and hotline) 68% of rapes and sexual assaults in the US are 
unreported (RAINN 2018), and according to Rape Crisis only 15% are reported in 
the UK (Rape Crisis England & Wales 2018). 
So upwards of 68% of sexual assaults and rapes are never reported to the 
police; theƐĞǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ18 testimony on their experience is simply not spoken. 
These women fail to speak about their suffering, usually because of fear. Linda 
ĞůĚĞŶƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶŝĞƐƚŽĂĐƌŝƐŝƐůŝŶĞŽǀĞƌtwo years, and found 
that the most common reason women had for not reporting crimes to the police 
was fear of retaliation and fear of police. The second most common reason was 
fear of family members finding out; this was mostly the case with underage 
women. The third most common reason was fear of not being believed, or being 
blamed, and fourth most common was fear of violence from their partner if they 
                                                          
17 The person who has sex with someone who has said yes and the person who 
has sex with someone who has said nothing have each done something quite 
different, and those differences should be attended to in discussions of that 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ?,ĞƌĞ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǁĞĂƌĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐ
silencing that affects what the woman can say.  
18 I am aware that not all rape victims are women, but seeing as this is a paper 
ĂďŽƵƚǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƐŝůĞŶĐŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚǁŽŵĞŶƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƵƉǁĂƌĚƐŽĨ ? ?A?ŽĨƌĂƉĞǀŝĐƚŝŵƐ ?
I will continue talking about women rape victims. RAINN estimates 9/10 victims 
of rape are women, Rape Crisis claims 94% are women, and Koss and Oros (1982, 
455) claim that according to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 
 “ǀŝƌƚƵĂůůǇ ? ? ?A? ?ĂƌĞǁŽŵĞŶ ? ?ƉƌĞƐƵŵĂďůǇƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐƵƉ ? ?
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found out (Linda Belden 1979 W1980, 9).19 McGregor and colleagues (2000, 659) 
ĚŽŶŽƚĚŝƐĐƵƐƐǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĨĞĂƌƐŽĨǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞŽƌƌĞƚĂůŝĂƚŝŽŶďƵƚĐŝƚĞĨĞĂƌŽĨŶŽƚďĞŝŶŐ
ďĞůŝĞǀĞĚĂƐƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƌĞĂƐŽŶǁŽŵĞŶĚŽŶ ?ƚƌĞƉŽƌƚƐĞǆƵĂůĂƐƐĂƵůƚĂŶĚƌĂƉĞ ? thus 
explaining why women raped by strangers and suffering obvious injuries are the 
most likely to report.20 I have now shown that women not speaking about their 
sexual assaults and rapes is extremely common and often due to fears of 
violence and unsympathetic (fundamentally disbelieving) treatment.  
It is surprising that so little attention has been paid to these cases in the 
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ?ŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƐŽǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚ ?tŝƚŚƵƐƚŝŶ ?ƐƐƉĞĞĐŚ
act theory being so influential, writers on silencing have been more often 
concerned with the things women do say (or try to say), than the things they 
ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ?ŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŝƐĂƌĞĨƌĞƐŚŝŶŐĂŶĚilluminating exception to that rule and 
provides us with the tools to explain potentially many kinds of silencing. 
 
Part  ? ?ŽƚƐŽŶ ?Ɛdestimonial Smothering 
In  “Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing ? ?Kristie 
Dotson (2011) describes ways in which marginalized races, and black women in 
particular, are silenced. She terms this silencing a kind of  “epistemic violence, ? 
and separates this silencing into two kinds:  “testimonial quieting ? and 
 “testimonial smothering. ? I will briefly ĞǆƉůĂŝŶŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚďĞĨŽƌĞ 
discussing how it can be utilized in discussions of pornography.  
ŬĞǇĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŶŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝƐpernicious ignorance; this means a 
reliable ignorance that causes harm in a given context. This kind of ignorance is 
ƌĞůŝĂďůĞŝŶƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐ “ĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚŽƌĨŽůůŽǁƐĨƌŽŵĂƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďůĞĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŝĐŐĂƉ ?21 
(Dotson 2011, 238). It must also cause harm, but this will be different in each 
case (unless you subscribe to the view that all ignorance is harmful); physical and 
emotional harms will count, as well as social harms or harms to a movement. To 
give a very simple example: if some reliable ignorance causes a man to assault a 
woman, that ignorance is pernicious. Epistemic violence occurs in relation to 
testimony when a hearer fails in understanding a speaker due to pernicious 
ignorance. Dotson describes two kinds of silencing that fit this model of 
                                                          
19 The third reason listed here (fear of disbelief or blame) is also common in the 
study by Jones et al. (2009), but the other fears are not reflected in their study 
with the same frequency. This is because their study is severely limited by ruling 
out women who do not speak good English, who were drunk when assaulted, 
and who did not want photographs taken of their vaginas (418). It is hardly 
surprising that women who have been sexually assaulted and are afraid of 
further assault would prefer not to have a stranger poking around in their vagina 
for the purposeƐŽĨ:ŽŶĞƐĞƚĂů ? ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇ ? 
20These authors collected data of 958 people who accessed the Sexual Assault 
Service over five years. 
21 An epistemic gap is a lack of knowledge.  
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epistemic violence. First, she describes  “testimonial quieting, ? when a hearer 
does not understand the speaker to be a person capable of knowing. For a 
speaker to give testimony, their audience must believe that they are knowers, 
otherwise their speech act will fail. When pernicious ignorance of a hearer 
causes them to not understand a speaker to be a knower, this constitutes 
testimonial quieting. The case that Dotson describes ŝƐǁŚĞŶďůĂĐŬǁŽŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
speech is not taken seriously because of ignorance about black women as 
knowers. I describe testimonial quietŝŶŐũƵƐƚƚŽŐŝǀĞĂĨƵůůĞƌƉŝĐƚƵƌĞŽĨŽƚƐŽŶ ?Ɛ
account and will not discuss this kind of silencing in any further detail.  
ŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐƐĞĐŽŶĚŬŝŶĚŽĨƐŝůĞŶĐŝŶŐŝƐ “testimonial smothering. ? This occurs 
when a speaker realizes that their audience may not react or understand their 
testimony in an appropriate way and so censors their own speech. Dotson (2011, 
244) ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶŝĂůƐŵŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐĂƐ “ƚŚĞƚƌƵŶĐĂƚŝŶŐŽĨŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇ
in ordeƌƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐŽŶůǇĐŽŶƚĞŶƚĨŽƌǁŚŝĐŚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
audience demonstrates testimonial competence. ? Dotson urges us to 
understand these cases not as a free choice to speak (or not speak) about certain 
things, but rather as a coerced silencing; something about the hearer has forced 
the speaker to restrict their testimony. To show how this happens, Dotson 
provides three circumstances that tend to feature22 in cases of testimonial 
smothering: 
 
1) the content of the testimony must be unsafe and risky; 
2) the audience must demonstrate testimonial incompetence with respect 
to the content of the testimony to the speaker; and  
3) testimonial incompetence must follow from, or appear to follow from, 
pernicious ignorance. (Dotson 2011, 244; line breaks added for emphasis) 
 
Before explaining these circumstances, I must first explain what Dotson 
means by  “testimonial incompetence. ? An audience possesses  “testimonial 
competence ? if they have the ability to understand the speaker ?s testimony and 
to identify cases where they have not understood the testimony. An audience 
possesses  “testimonial incompetence ? if they would fail to understand the 
speaker ?s testimony and also fail to realize that they have not understood the 
testimony.23 For an audience to  “understand ?24 the testimony, they must find it 
 “clearly comprehensible and defeasibly intelligible ? (Dotson 2011, 245). This 
                                                          
22 It is not clear whether Dotson intends these conditions to be necessary for 
testimonial smothering, or for a number of them to be necessary. I think she can 
make that claim if she wants, but I will continue without making a commitment 
to this as it has little effect on my account.  
23 Explained more thoroughly in Dotson (2011, 247). 
24 DoƚƐŽŶĐĂůůƐƚŚŝƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŬŝŶĚŽĨƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ “ĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞŝŶƚĞůůŝŐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?
(245). 
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does not require that the audience clearly comprehend all of the testimony, but 
that the parts that the audience does not comprehend are apparent to them; 
ƚŚĞǇŬŶŽǁǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚ “get it. ? The example Dotson offers to illustrate this 
is herself attending a lecture on nuclear physics as a layperson: it will be pretty 
easy for her to tell when some material is not comprehensible to her (245 W246). 
The first circumstance refers to situations in which speaking a certain 
testimony may risk harmful consequences. Dotson (2011, 244 W245) gives the 
example of women in African American communities wanting to report domestic 
violence, but being aware that there is a risk that hearers may understand their 
testimony as reinforcing racist associations between black people and violence. 
So, for black women, testimonies about domestic violence might be unsafe and 
risky because of the risk of harming attitudes to black people in general.  
The second circumstance refers to situations in which the audience 
indicate that it is likely that they will fail to understand whatever it is that the 
speaker wants to say. How they demonstrate this misunderstanding can be 
understood very broadly, to include examples such as an eye-roll or the hearer ?s 
tone of voice indicating that they will be unsympathetic to the speaker ?s point of 
view, but in a way that relates to a particular lack of understanding. Whether this 
has occurred is left in the hands of the speaker: if they perceive25 testimonial 
incompetence, this condition has been met (regardless of the ŚĞĂƌĞƌ ?Ɛ intention). 
For example, if a man says to me,  “ƌĞƉĞƌŝŽĚƐƌĞĂůůǇƚŚĂƚďĂĚ ? ?ƚŚĞŶŚĞŚĂƐ
indicated testimonial incompetence about periods. Testimonial incompetence 
has been indicated by his word choice ( “really ? suggests disbelief) and by the 
need to ask the question at all; his asking shows that he has limited 
understanding of periods. I may then choose to silence myself, rather than risk 
him misunderstanding my testimony and thinking I am exaggerating or attention-
ƐĞĞŬŝŶŐ ?tŚŝůĞ/ƌĞŵĂŝŶĨĂŝƚŚĨƵůƚŽŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ
features, here I am persuaded by Beecroft that an amendment is necessary. 
Beecroft (unpublished, 7 W9) argues that the audience not demonstrating 
incompetence is not usually enough to enable a speaker to speak their 
testimony, as it is often reasonable for the speaker to come to expect 
incompetence until the audience demonstrates otherwise. Given a context 
where rape myths are widely believed, it has to be demonstrated by the 
ĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚbelieve rape myths, that is, that they are testimonially 
competent. One additional reason for accepting this amendment is that it more 
                                                          
25 I am going to assume that in all our cases, the perception on the part of the 
ƐƉĞĂŬĞƌŝƐĂ “ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ?ŽŶĞ ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚĂĚĞůƵƐŝŽŶŽĨƐŽŵĞŬŝŶĚ ?dŚŝƐŝƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞ
while the speaker is not infallible, the speaker is well positioned to assess the 
level of understanding of their own speech, particularly when that speech is 
about something in regard to which their interlocutor is socially situated such 
that they are less likely to have direct access to the information (more on this 
later). See also note 31. 
Vince: Testimonial Smothering and Pornography 
 
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018  9 
 
neatly parallels the third condition; for the third condition, pernicious ignorance 
must only appear ƚŽďĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƐƉĞĂŬĞƌ ?s perspective. Since we 
prioritizĞƚŚĞƐƉĞĂŬĞƌ ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞctive for the third condition, it makes sense to do 
the same for the second. So the second circumstance can be restated as P “The 
audience must either demonstrate testimonial incompetence, or fail to 
demonstrate their competence, with respect to the content of the testimony to 
the speaker ? (Beecroft, 9). 
The third circumstance will refer to situations described in the second 
circumstance, but with the additional qualifier that the testimonial 
incompetence displayed appears to be ĐĂƵƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞŚĞĂƌĞƌ ?ƐƉĞƌŶŝĐŝŽƵƐ
ignorance. Remember, pernicious ignorance is a reliable ignorance that causes 
harm in a given context. So if the aforementioned man has a gap in his 
knowledge about periods, and that ignorance causes harm, it counts as 
pernicious ignorance. In this example, it causes harm by virtue of making me feel 
ashamed and making me silence myself; Dotson and I agree that someone 
silencing themselves can be understood as a harm in itself.26 A less 
controversially harmful consequence would perhaps be that I am not granted 
sick leave ĂƐƚŚĞŵĂŶŝƐŵǇďŽƐƐĂŶĚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƉĂŝŶ/ĂŵŝŶ ?Žƌ/Ăŵ
not offered painkillers by him. In addition to  “pernicious ignorance, ? Dotson 
provides us with the concept of  “situated ignorance ?; situated ignorance is 
ignorance possessed due to some social or epistemic position one holds. People 
in different positions have access to different knowledges, with epistemic 
advantages in some areas and disadvantages in others.27 The man in my example 
is in the position of being male, and this position means he does not have the 
tools to readily/directly understand the experience of periods; he is epistemically 
disadvantaged in understanding female bodily functions.28 In the same way, a 
white person will not have the tools to easily understand aspects of nonwhite 
communities, so they possess situated ignorance regarding nonwhite 
communities. Although situated ignorance is probably unconscious and not 
blameworthy,29 it can still count as pernicious. Firstly, situated ignorance is very 
much reliable; white people will consistently lack information about life in black 
communities, and this lack of knowledge is predictable. Secondly, situated 
                                                          
26 At least when caused by a reliable ignorance. See Dotson (2011, 241). 
27 This thought is rooted in Standpoint Epistemology. For an account of this, see 
Harding (1993) or Longino (1990, 1999).  
28 Again, I am aware that some men do have periods, but I am counting the man 
in my example as one who does not and am writing in this way for the sake of 
ease. 
29 Although we may be considered morally responsible for making ourselves 
aware of potential situated ignorance that we might possess.  
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ignorance can certainly cause harm.30 My period-pain example is a clear instance 
of this; the man possesses situated ignorance about periods, and his failing to 
understand my period pain causes harm. Similarly, a black woman might suffer 
from a white person not understanding her testimony about experiences of 
racial injustice ?ǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǁŚŝƚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞŝƐĐůĞĂƌůǇsituated. Although 
situated ignorance is a kind of pernicious ignorance when it is harmful, there can 
also be situated ignorance that is not pernicious. It may appear that there is little 
difference between nonpernicious situated ignorance and everyday epistemic 
variations (e.g., Carli knows more about football than Dana because Carli is a 
footballer); however, the key difference is that situated ignorance results from 
broader social structures (e.g., race, class, gender, etc.) and is therefore much 
more difficult to overcome.31 For this reason, situated ignorance is an important 
theoretical tool in understanding some types of epistemic variation. 
I have now explained the three circumstances for testimonial smothering 
and presented one kind of pernicious ignorance: situated ignorance. I will next 
move on to apply these concepts to pornography, refusal, and reporting assault. 
Unsurprisingly, I will discuss situated ignorance men may possess with regard to 
information about life as a woman, as well as how pornography may contribute 
to testimonial incompetence. 
 
Part 3: Silenced Refusal 
For this discussion we will consider two cases of silenced refusal and 
ĞǆƉůĂŝŶƚŚĞŵǁŝƚŚŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶŝĂůƐŵŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ?dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĐĂƐĞǁŝůůďĞŵŽƌĞ
decisive than the second, but I want to show that both count as silencing by 
pornography. 
 
x Case (A): Edina does not want to have sex, but she consents to sex with 
Franco because she is afraid of the consequences of refusal; she has 
reason32 to suspect Franco may be violent or end their relationship if she 
refuses. 
                                                          
30 Note: situated ignorance is only also pernicious ignorance when it causes 
harm. 
31 It would be fairly easy for Dana to learn lots about football if she wished to, 
but not so easy to learn about working-class motherhood when Dana is upper 
class.  
32 I am going to assume in all of the cases we are considering that the beliefs the 
speaker holds about the audience are held for a reason. Beliefs held 
 “ƵŶƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇ ?ŵŝŐŚƚŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶŝĂůƐŵŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ
is going on in those cases. It may be that in cases where it is ambiguous whether 
there is a reason for belief or not, or good reasons for belief, it is more difficult to 
determine whether testimonial smothering is occurring, but this worry is beyond 
the scope of this paper.  
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x Case (B): Gina does not want to have sex, but she consents to sex with 
Harry because she feels like it is expected of her and refusing would be 
rude or inappropriate,33 perhaps because she had had sex with him in the 
past. 
 
/ǁŝůůŶŽǁƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞƚǁŽĐĂƐĞƐŵĞĞƚĂůůƚŚƌĞĞŽĨŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ
for testimonial smothering.34  
 
 ?dŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇŵƵƐƚďĞƵŶƐĂĨĞĂŶĚƌŝƐŬǇ ? 
Edina certainly believes that speaking refusal would be unsafe/risky, and 
she is not alone. In addition to the evidence above that many women believe 
they are at risk of being raped or of having their relationship terminated if they 
refuse, women may also be afraid of nonsexual violence upon refusal. The 
website When Women Refuse35 documents testimonies from women who have 
experienced violence after refusing sex, as well as news stories about women 
who were murdered, or had family members or pets murdered, as a result of 
refusing sex. tŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĨĞĂƌƐŽĨǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?ƐĞǆƵĂůǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ
termination are not unfounded; there are plenty of data to show women being 
assaulted upon refusal. New stories appear on the When Women Refuse page 
every day, and 20% of women in one study had consented to sex because when 
they refused in the past their current partner had assaulted them (Basile 1999, 
1050).36 So the first circumstance has been met for case (A).  
Although Gina may not consider herself at risk of violence to the same 
extent as Edina, she is risking other things. Gina thinks refusal would be 
 “inappropriate, ? so she is risking being seen as rude, being socially ostracized, 
and being in an uncomfortable situation where she must feel guilty for doing 
something inappropriate. I urge the reader to not be biased by ĚŝŶĂ ?ƐƌŝƐŬ
seeming greater; this is still a risk, albeit of a different kind. Again the data in part 
1 show us ƚŚĂƚ'ŝŶĂ ?ƐǁŽƌƌŝĞƐĂƌĞŶŽƚƵŶĐŽŵŵŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇŶot 
unfounded: many men believe that in certain situations a woman has a duty to 
have sex,37 and that in some situations a woman has indicated she wants to have 
                                                          
33 By inappropriate, I mean something like seen as a surprising or disappointing 
way to behave, not meeting social expectations. 
34 ŐĂŝŶ ?ƐŝŶĐĞ/ĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚĂůůƚŚƌĞĞĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĂƌĞŵĞƚ ?ŝƚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŵĂƚƚĞƌ
whether Dotson means them all to be necessary or not. However, if they are not 
all necessary, then there is room for a reader to deny that one or more of them 
are met in my examples, and my conclusions will still follow.  
35 http://whenwomenrefuse.tumblr.com/. 
36 ĂƐŝůĞ ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚƚĞůĞƉŚŽŶĞŝŶterviews with a sample of 41 women who 
had experienced unwanted sex in their long-term relationship or marriage.  
37 I have been unable to find evidence that supports this claim word-for-word, 
ĂŶĚŵǇĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚďĞŶĞĨŝƚŐƌĞĂƚůǇĨƌŽŵĂƐƚƵĚǇŝŶƚŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƉĞrceptions of 
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sex, and in such situations it would be seen as rude or unconventional for her to 
refuse.38 So in case (B), the first circumstance for testimonial smothering is met, 
as refusal would be risky for Gina. 
 
 ?dŚĞĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞŵƵƐƚĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶŝĂůŝŶĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞ, or fail to 
demonstrate their competence, with respect to the content of the testimony to 
ƚŚĞƐƉĞĂŬĞƌ ? 
Testimonial incompetence with regard to women refusing sex seems like 
it would cover a broad range of attitudes. A man not understanding that she 
wants to sincerely refuse, that refusing can be frightening for women, and that 
the refusal is about her desires and not a tool to harm his ego, are all 
misunderstandings that men may demonstrate about refusal. More serious 
misunderstandings may also be demonstrated; sometimes men may give the 
impression that they do not understand women to be beings with beliefs and 
desires as complex and important as their own. In case (A), for Edina to have got 
the impression that refusing may be risky, Franco must have given some 
indication that he would not consider refusal acceptable (or at least, failed to 
indicate that refusal is acceptable). Whether this indication was deliberate or 
not, the salient factor is that Edina reasonably interpreted the situation in that 
way.39 So the second circumstance has also been met. As in case (A), the second 
circumstance for case (B) will be met, as Gina must have understood Harry as 
demonstrating testimonial incompetence by virtue of the fact that she thinks he 
would take refusal to be inappropriate. Again we can posit the same kinds of 
testimonial incompetences as in case (A). 
 
 ?dĞƐƚŝŵŽŶŝĂůŝŶĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞŵƵƐƚĨŽůůŽǁĨƌŽŵ ?ŽƌĂƉƉĞĂƌƚŽĨŽůůŽǁĨƌŽŵ ?
ƉĞƌŶŝĐŝŽƵƐŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞ ? 
ŽĞƐ&ƌĂŶĐŽ ?ƐĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶŝĂůŝŶĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞĨŽůůŽǁĨƌŽŵƉĞƌŶŝĐŝŽƵƐ
ignorance? There are two likely scenarios under which it does. First, if Franco 
accepts rape myths, this is a clear example of pernicious ignorance. Rape myths 
are false beliefs about rape that tend to represent the victim in a more negative 
or blameworthy light and represent rapists in a more positive light, often 
denying that they are in fact rapists. I suggest that rape myths count as 
                                                          
ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĚƵƚŝĞƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƐƚƵĚŝĞƐƐŚŽǁŝŶŐŵĂŶǇŵĞŶďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĞǇ
have a right to sex (see Bouffard 2010), and showing that men should expect sex 
when women do certain things, like visit their home: see Bouffard (2010) and 
Burt (1978, 1980).  
38 &ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ? ?A?ŽĨŵĞŶƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚǀŝƐŝƚŝŶŐĂŵĂŶ ?ƐŚŽŵĞŽŶĂĚĂƚĞŝŵƉůŝĞƐ
willingness to have sex (Burt 1978, 301). 
39 If Franco has not given such an indication, but Edina has instead inferred 
testimonial incompetence from her experiences with other men, Franco has at 
the very least still failed to indicate testimonial competence.  
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pernicious ignorance;40 a false belief about rape victims is a kind of ignorance, 
and since rape myths are so commonly accepted, this ignorance is reliable. This 
reliable ignorance also tends to cause harm, as acceptance of rape myths 
correlates with committing rape as well as with poor treatment of victims (Burt 
1980; Loh et al. 2005; Check and Guloien 1989, 170 W171).41 So belief in rape 
myths meets our definition of pernicious ignorance. If Franco accepts any rape 
myths (or Edina perceives that he does) ƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞƚŽŚŝƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƚŽĚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ
agency and refusal, then his apparent testimonial incompetence is a result of 
pernicious ignorance and thus meets our third circumstance. We can also 
consider Edina consenting to unwanted sex as a harm,42 so even ŝĨ&ƌĂŶĐŽ ?Ɛ
ignorance was not contributing to wider harms, it has caused a harm here. A 
ƐĞĐŽŶĚǁĂǇŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ&ƌĂŶĐŽ ?ƐƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶŝĂůŝŶĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞŵĂǇĨŽůůŽǁĨƌŽŵ
pernicious ignorance is by virtue of the fact that he is a man in a society 
structured by gender hierarchy. Recall that situated ignorance is a kind of 
pernicious ignorance which one is more likely or better placed to possess by 
being a member of a particular group. As a man, Franco may well have situated 
ignorance in relation to information about life as a woman, including the kinds of 
experiences women have of refusing sex and having their desires respected (or 
not). Franco does not have direct access to the perspective of someone who may 
be afraid of refusing sex, afraid of violence, and accustomed to having their 
testimony taken less seriously.43 Case (A) therefore meets the third circumstance 
in various ways, and we can now see how situated ignorance allows most cases 
to meet the third circumstance meet the third circumstance, provided there is 
also a harm involved, as there is here ?ĂƐĞ ? ?ŵĞĞƚƐŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐƚŚƌĞĞ
circumstances for testimonial smothering, so we can say that Edina has been 
silenced in this way.  
,ĂƌƌǇ ?ƐƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶŝĂůŝŶĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐĨƌŽŵƉĞƌŶŝĐŝŽƵƐignorance in 
much ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞǁĂǇƐĂƐ&ƌĂŶĐŽ ?ƐĚŽĞƐ P If Harry believes any rape myths 
                                                          
40 Beecroft (unpublished) again makes almost exactly the same moves as I do 
here; she argues that rape myths are both pernicious ignorance and epistemic 
violence. 
41 Loh et al. assessed 325 men for sexist and rape-myth-accepting beliefs and 
attitudes, and for likelihood to commit certain kinds of sexual assaults, using 
multiple scales. Check and Guloien exposed 436 men to no films, sexually violent 
ĨŝůŵƐ ?ŽƌŶŽŶƐĞǆƵĂůďƵƚĚĞŚƵŵĂŶŝǌŝŶŐĨŝůŵƐĂŶĚĂƐƐĞƐĞĚƚŚĞŵĞŶ ?ƐĚŝĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ
sexually aggressive attitudes and behaviours. 
42 Even if such consenting isn ?ƚĂŚĂƌŵŝŶŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ? ?A?ŽĨǁŽŵĞŶƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚƐŽŵĞ
ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐŽĨĐŽŶƐĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŽƵŶǁĂŶƚĞĚƐĞǆ ?K ?^ƵůůŝǀĂŶĂŶĚůůŐĞŝĞƌ
1998, 240). 
43 Though Franco could gain indirect access to this kind of information, by 
listening to and attempting to understand perspectives of women, he does not 
have direct access to it; the information is not as readily available to him. 
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(particularly ones relating to when refusal can be given), the third circumstance 
is met immediately. If Harry believes there are circumstances in which women 
have a duty to have sex, then Harry possesses a reliable false belief that directly 
ƌĞůĂƚĞƐƚŽ'ŝŶĂ ?ƐĨĞĂƌƐĂďŽƵƚƌĞĨƵƐĂů ?/ŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞ,ĂƌƌǇǁŽƵůĚďĞůŝĞǀĞĞǆĂĐƚůǇ
what Gina fears he might believe: that her refusal would be inappropriate. This 
certainly counts as pernicious ignorance, as Gina not refusing is a harmful 
consequence. Harry also possesses situated ignorance by virtue of being a man. 
In particular, Harry will not have the tools to easily understand the feeling of 
pressure to have sex that women experience,44 and how this makes women feel 
uncomfortable or guilty in refusing. Harry also is less well equipped to 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƐŵĂǇĨĞĞůůŝŬĞŝŶƚŚĞƐĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ
women may reasonably want to refuse in circumstances like this. Harry is simply 
not in the right situation to easily ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŚŽǁǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐƚŽƌĞĨƵƐĂů
and consent may work. Thus in case (B), Harry possesses some pernicious 
ŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƐŝƚƵĂƚĞĚŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞĂďŽƵƚǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐŽĨ
refusal.45 
At this point I should have shown that cases like (A) and (B) are common 
ĂŶĚĐŽƵŶƚĂƐŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶŝĂůƐŵŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐŽŶŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ?I suggest 
that real-world cases similar to (A) and (B) which meet the three circumstances 
will also be testimonial smothering. This is valuaďůĞĨŽƌĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐƌĞĂů-
world experiences of consenting to unwanted sex and illustrating the breadth of 
ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ? 
 
Is this silencing by pornography? 
My account provides good reason to believe that pornography is a cause 
of silencing. It thus helps us understand where pernicious ignorance can come 
from and provides a new direction for the pornography debate.46 I first claim 
ƚŚĂƚƉŽƌŶŽŐƌĂƉŚǇŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƐŵĞŶ ?ƐĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƌĂƉĞŵǇƚŚƐ, and this makes 
pornography the source of pernicious ignorance in the cases we are considering. 
Then, to strengthen the connection between our case and pornography, I show 
that these rape myths correspond to reasons women silence their refusal.  
                                                          
44 Remember it is not impossible for Harry to gain this understanding; he is just 
not well placed to access it easily.  
45 It could be objected here that this ignorance exculpates men who fail to 
ensure that the women with whom they are having sex really want to have sex 
with them; I do not mean to imply this. We should ensure the consent our 
partner gives us is enthusiastic and should attempt to identify and minimize any 
harmful ignorances we possess.  
46 I do not claim pornography is the only contributory factor; there may well be 
ŽƚŚĞƌƚŚŝŶŐƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚŝƐŬŝŶĚŽĨƐŝůĞŶĐŝŶŐ ?/ĂůƐŽĚŽŶ ?ƚŵĞĂŶƚŽŝŵƉůǇƚŚĂƚ
this is a singularly good reason to restrict pornography. I only mean to suggest 
that pornography plays a role here. 
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Multiple studies demonstrate pornography negatively affects ŵĞŶ ?Ɛ
attitudes to women and sex; a collection of evidence that pornography causes 
men to treat women more callously can be found in Zillmann and Weaver (1989). 
Zillmann (1989, 134 W135) also found that both men and women consider rapists 
less blameworthy and deserving of jail time after repeated exposure to 
pornography.47 Pornography-using mĞŶĂƌĞŵŽƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚŵǇƚŚƐůŝŬĞ “Ă
ǁŽŵĂŶĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚŵĞĂŶŶŽƵŶƚŝůƐŚĞƐůĂƉƐǇŽƵ ?ĂŶĚ “ǁŽŵĞŶĞŶũŽǇƌĂƉĞ ?
(Donnerstein, Linz, and Penrod 1987, 75 W76; Malamuth and Check 1985). Many 
studies show that pornography use leads men and women to consider rape 
victims as less injured and rapists as less deserving of punishment.48 All of this 
suggests that exposure to pornography means men are more likely to harbour 
attitudes less sympathetic to women and support rape myths.49  
Burt (1978) presented an influential study documenting how common 
belief in rape myths actually was.50,51 Many of these rape myths contain content 
that is directly relevant to reasons women do not refuse unwanted sex. The best 
explanation of this similarity in content, I claim, is that the one influences the 
other. Where 50% of people believe the rape myth thĂƚǀŝƐŝƚŝŶŐĂŵĂŶ ?ƐŚŽŵĞŽŶ
a date implies willingness to have sex (Burt 1978, 301 W302), a woman may not 
refuse unwanted sex on a date because she  “ĚŝĚŶŽƚǁĂŶƚƚŽƐĞĞŵůŝŬĞ[she] had 
ďĞĞŶůĞĂĚŝŶŐŚŝŵŽŶ ?52 (Shotland and Hunter 1995, 232 W233), with recognition 
of the aforementioned rape myth informing that decision. Similarly, the 32.8% of 
                                                          
47 dŚĞƐƚƵĚǇĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŚĞƌĞƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ?ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐĂĨƚĞƌŶŽĞǆƉŽƐƵƌĞƚŽ
pornography, moderate exposure (3 films a week for 6 weeks), and massive 
exposure (6 films a week for 6 weeks). Their attitudes were assessed one week, 
two weeks, and three weeks after the final film. In the third week after the final 
Ĩŝůŵ ?ƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚƐǁŚŽǁĞƌĞĞǆƉŽƐĞĚƚŽ “ŵĂƐƐŝǀĞ ?ĂŵŽƵŶƚƐŽĨƉŽƌŶŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ
reliably recommended much less harsh sentences for rapists than those subjects 
of lower exposure.  
48 For example, Zillmann (1989, 134 W136) and Malamuth and Check (1985). 
49 For additional evidence see Peter and Valkenburg (2011), Foubert, Brosi, and 
Bannon (2011) and Hald, Malamuth, and Lange (2013). 
50 This study questioned 599 members of the public, 99 social workers who were 
likely to have worked with rapists, and 36 rapists, and asked to what extent they 
ĂŐƌĞĞĚǁŝƚŚĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĐůĂŝŵƐ ?ůŝŬĞ “ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽĐŽƵŶƚƐĂƐƌĂƉĞǆ ?Žƌ “ǁŽŵĞŶĚĞƐĞƌǀĞ
ĂƐƐĂƵůƚŝĨǆ ? ?/Ƶse the general public results here.  
51 This might seem dated, but Edwards et al. (2011) collect more recent data that 
show only fractionally better attitudes. For example, they found evidence that 
25 W35% of people agree with most rape myths and 66% of people agree with 
some (Edwards et al. 2011, 762). I use the Burt study as it is the most 
comprehensive. 
52 Shotland and Hunter found 56% of women not refusing sex for this reason 
(1995, 232 W233). 
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women who ŚĂǀĞƐĞǆďĞĐĂƵƐĞ “refusal would be pointless, as he would do it 
ĂŶǇǁĂǇ ? (Koss and Oros 1982, 456) have identified the prevalence (17%) of 
myths like,  “A woman who is drunk and has sex with a man at a party is  ‘fair 
game ? to be raped by others at the party ? (Burt 1978, 301 W302).What these 
figures illustrate is that where a man may demonstrate testimonial 
incompetence by indicating acceptance of a rape myth, a woman may not speak 
her refusal because she has perceived this attitude.53 Returning to case B: Gina 
ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞƐƚŚĂƚ,ĂƌƌǇŝƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚƚŚĞƌĂƉĞŵǇƚŚ “if a woman participates in 
other sex acts with a man, it is her fault if he rapes her, ? and since she has 
participated in other sex acts with Harry, she chooses not to refuse because 
 “ ?ƐŚĞ ?ŚĂĚƐĞǆǁŝƚŚŚŝŵďĞĨŽƌĞƐŽ ?ƐŚĞ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŚĞ ?ƐŚŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚƌĞĨƵƐĞ. ?
Though many cases will not have such a strong direct link between the content 
of his pernicious ignorance and her reasons for not refusing, this illustrates my 
hypothesis well; pernicious ignorance in the form of rape myths causes 
ƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶŝĂůƐŵŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐŽĨǁŽŵĞŶǁŚŽǁĂŶƚƚŽƌĞĨƵƐĞƐĞǆďƵƚĚŽŶ ?ƚ ?
I have shown that in cases like (A) and (B) women experience testimonial 
smothering of refusal, and that pornography can contribute to a key source of 
pernicious ignorance: rape myths. If this is right, a change in focus in feminist 
discussions of pornography may be necessary, from speech act theory to 
testimonial smothering. 
 
Part 4: Silenced Reports 
We now turn to the second way women are silenced: silenced reports of 
sexual assault. In this section we explore two cases of silenced reporting of 
ƐĞǆƵĂůĂƐƐĂƵůƚƐ ?ĂŶĚĂƉƉůǇŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶŝĂůƐŵothering to them. As in part 3, 
the first case will be more decisive than the second but I argue that both count 
as testimonial smothering.  
 
x Case (C): Ida was raped. Ida would like to report the crime but does not 
because she suspects her rapist or her (male) partner may be violent if 
she says anything.  
x Case (D): Jesse was raped. Jesse would like to report the crime but does 
not because she suspects she will be blamed or not believed.  
 
Next, /ƐŚŽǁƚŚĂƚďŽƚŚĐĂƐĞƐŵĞĞƚŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐƚŚƌĞĞĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐĨŽƌtestimonial 
smothering.  
 
 
                                                          
53 It should be noted that while many of the studies into rape myth acceptance 
take both men and women in their samples, it has been shown that rape myth 
acceptance is significantly greater among men than women. See, e.g., Anderson, 
Cooper, and Okamura (1997) or Suarez and Gadalla (2010). 
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 ?dŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇŵƵƐƚďĞƵŶƐĂĨĞĂŶĚƌŝƐŬǇ ? 
Ida certainly believes the content of her testimony would be unsafe or 
ƌŝƐŬǇ ?ĞůĚĞŶ ?Ɛ (1979 W1980) study recorded many women giving fear of 
retaliation as a reason not to report sexual assault; this is particularly common 
where the assailant is not a stranger (which is more likely anyway).54 Again this 
fear is not unfounded; the assailant has already proven he is willing and able to 
use violence against a woman. As regards intimate partners, I could not find any 
data to show men being violent as a result of learning their partner has been 
ƌĂƉĞĚ ?ĂƐƚŚĞƌĞŝƐůŝƚƚůĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƌĞĐŽƌĚŝŶŐŵĞŶ ?ƐŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ?
However, given that 22% of women in Europe have experienced violence from 
their partners (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2014, 21) and 
34% of UK women have experienced violence in a previous relationship 
(European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2014, 29), the woman who 
gives her partner bad news (particularly news he may blame her for55) has 
reason to fear. Belden (1979 W1980, 12) describes one particular case where a 
ǁŽŵĂŶǁĂƐƌĂƉĞĚďǇŚĞƌŚƵƐďĂŶĚ ?ƐĞŵƉůŽǇĞĞ, and she did not report it because 
 “ŚĞƌďŝŐŐĞƐƚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶǁĂƐƚŽŐĞƚŚŽŵĞ ?ĐůĞĂŶƵƉ ?ĂŶĚŐĞƚŚĞƌƚŽƌŶĐůŽƚŚĞƐŚŝĚĚĞŶ
before her  ‘violent and jealous ? husband got home. . . . She was terrified about 
what he would do if he found out she had been raped. ?I think this suffices to say 
that the fiƌƐƚĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶŵĞƚĨŽƌ/ĚĂ ?ƐĐĂƐĞ P women can reasonably 
believe that reporting rape risks violence. 
In case (D) Jesse considers the content of her testimony risky: she is 
risking being blamed or not believed. Jones and colleagues (2009, 420) report 
73% of women chose not to report rape because they feared other people would 
think the women were responsible. This fear is justified; 53% of students believe 
ƚŚĂƚĂǁŽŵĂŶ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐĐĂƵƐĞĚŚĞƌĂƐƐĂƵůƚ (McMahon 2010). Forty-nine percent 
of women in JŽŶĞƐ ?s study did not report rape because they thought some 
people would not believe them. Again, this fear is justified; many people believe 
that women lie about rape.56 The likelihood of disbelief is greater when the 
victim knows the assailant, as is the case in 90% of rapes (Rape Crisis England & 
Wales 2018). The risk of being blamed or not believed is very real, and there is 
the associated risk of experiencing distress and relationship problems if the 
ǀŝĐƚŝŵ ?ƐůŽǀĞĚŽŶĞƐdo not believe her, as well as the distress of police/courts not 
believing her. 
 
                                                          
54 ƐŽŶĞǀŝĐƚŝŵƐĂŝĚ ? “/Ĩ ?ŚĞǁere] not convicted, [he] could immediately wreak 
ǀĞŶŐĞĂŶĐĞŽŶŵĞ ? ?ĞůĚĞŶ ? ? ? ? W1980, 11). 
55 When discussing case (D), we will see just how common victim-blaming is.  
56 Fifty-six percent of people think women lie about rape when they are annoyed 
with a man (Burt 1978, 302). 
Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, 2018, Vol. 4, Iss. 3, Article 5 
 
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018  18 
 
 ?dŚĞĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞŵƵƐƚĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶŝĂůŝŶĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞ, or fail to 
demonstrate their competence, with respect to the content of the testimony to 
ƚŚĞƐƉĞĂŬĞƌ ? 
If Ida is afraid that her partner will be violent, then she has taken him 
(rightly or otherwise) to have incompetence regarding her testimony, as violence 
is not the response her testimony calls for. If it is the rapist that Ida fears, then 
her silence might be testimonial smothering in the same way as JeƐƐĞ ?ƐŝƐ ?she 
suspects the police, her family, or other hearers might not respond in the right 
way to her testimony. Alternatively, if Ida is only ĂĨƌĂŝĚŽĨƚŚĞƌĂƉŝƐƚ ?ƐƌĞƚĂůŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?
and has no concerns about how her hearers will respond, then this condition is 
not met, and what Ida is suffering is straightforward threats or blackmail, rather 
than testimonial smothering in particular. I will proceed as if it is her partner that 
Ida fears, for the sake of simplicity. In case (D), for Jesse to get the impression 
that the hearer would not believe her or would blame her, she must have 
perceived them as displaying testimonial incompetence. Further, testimonial 
incompetence is often displayed by police and attorneys regarding rape: Forty-
three percent of attorneys showed moderate to high rape myth acceptance 
(Edwards et al. 2011), and police sometimes jeer at victims and do not file 
ƌĞƉŽƌƚƐǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚbelieve victims.57 Policemen, and men in general, can be 
read as demonstrating testimonial incompetence in relation to rape victims. This 
ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŝƐĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚǁĞůůďǇŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽŵĞŶŝŶĞůĚĞŶ ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇ P “ĨƚĞƌŚĂůĨ
a lifetime of living and learning about male attitudes, I had absolutely no 
ĂƐƐƵƌĂŶĐĞŽĨŵĞĞƚŝŶŐĂƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀĞŵĂůĞŝŶƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨĂůůƉůĂĐĞƐ ?(1979 W
1980, 10). In /ĚĂ ?ƐĂŶĚ:ĞƐƐĞ ?ƐĐĂƐĞƐ, the second circumstance has been met, as 
testimonial incompetence can be, and is, demonstrated by police and by other 
ƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶƚŚĞǀŝĐƚŝŵƐ ?ůŝǀĞƐ. 
 
 ?dĞƐƚŝŵŽŶŝĂůŝŶĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞŵƵƐƚĨŽůůŽǁĨƌŽŵ ?ŽƌĂƉƉĞĂƌƚŽĨŽůůŽǁĨƌŽŵ ?
ƉĞƌŶŝĐŝŽƵƐŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞ ? 
The partner who thinks violence is an appropriate response to a report of 
rape can be said to have pernicious ignorance. Firstly, if he accepts any rape 
myths, then this condition is met. For example, ŝĨ/ĚĂ ?ƐƉĂƌƚŶĞƌďĞůŝĞǀĞs, with 53% 
                                                          
57 EƵŵĞƌŽƵƐǁŽŵĞŶŝŶĞůĚĞŶ ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌĞĚĂĨƚĞƌƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌ
experience that the police never followed through with the report. Some quoted 
ƉŽůŝĐĞŵĞŶĂƐƐĂǇŝŶŐƚŚŝŶŐƐůŝŬĞ ? “tŚǇĚŝĚŶ ?ƚǇŽƵũƵƐƚƐŝ ďĂĐŬĂŶĚĞŶũŽǇŝƚ ? ?
(1979 W1980, 10). Sadly, more recent studies report similar testimonies, for 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ PŽŶĞŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐĂŝĚ ? “ŽŵĞŽŶ<ĂƚŚůĞĞŶ ?ǁĞŬŶŽǁǇŽƵ ĂƌĞŵĂŬŝŶŐƚŚŝƐƵƉ ?
We know you were having an affair and you were having sex that morning and it 
all got a bit rough and you made all ƚŚŝƐƵƉƐŽǇŽƵƌŚƵƐďĂŶĚĚŽĞƐŶ ?ƚĨŝŶĚŽƵƚ ?
(Jordan 2008, 56). See also: Jordan (2011). 
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of students (McMahon 2010), 58 ƚŚĂƚĂǁŽŵĂŶ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐůĞĂĚƚŽŚĞƌďĞŝŶŐ
sexually assaulted, then that is a reliable ignorance that causes harm. It causes 
harm in this instance in particular, as Ida feeling unable to give her testimony is a 
harm,59 and it causes broader harms, as acceptance of rape myths reliably 
predicts the likelihood of performing violence and sexual violence (Burt 1980; 
Loh et al. 2005; Lackie and de Man 1997;60 Check and Guloien 1989, 170 W171). 
Secondly, the partner will possess situated ignorance, again by virtue of being a 
man. He ƐŝŵƉůǇǁŽŶ ?ƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚŝƚŝƐůŝŬĞƚŽĨĞar violence from men and 
what it is like to be a victim.61 As in Case (C), the testimonial incompetence in 
case (D) is rooted in pernicious ignorance in two ways: rape myths and situated 
ignorance. In cases where women are not believed or are being blamed, it is very 
likely that rape myths are being believed; all the examples I have drawn on here 
are rape myths (e.g., women lie about rape, women cause their own assaults, 
etc.). I will demonstrate the extent of these rape myths in the next section. Belief 
in rape myths counts as reliable ignorance that causes a harm ? not just the harm 
caused by rape myth acceptance in general, but also the harm for the individual 
who cannot testify about their assault. Secondly, policemen and other hearers 
who are men will possess situated ignorance by virtue of being men; that is, 
being people not accustomed to being taken less seriously whenever they speak, 
and being afraid of men. They possess the situated ignorance of being men, and 
not being victims, and perhaps in addition the pernicious ignorance of believing 
rape myths. Case (D) has now met all three of the circumstances for testimonial 
smothering. 
 
Is this silencing by pornography? 
I argued in part 3 that pornography influenced acceptance of rape myths. 
Given this, if there are common rape myths causing women not to report sexual 
assaults, this too has roots in pornography. In addition to the myths described 
previously, we can add some more with content that corresponds to reasons 
women do not report sexual assault. I again claim that the best explanation of 
this similarity in content is that the one influences the other: where 69% of 
people believe the rape myth that in most rapes the victim was promiscuous or 
                                                          
58 DĐDĂŚŽŶ ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇƐƵƌǀĞǇĞĚ ? ? ? ? ?ƐƚƵĚĞŶƚƐƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ/ůůŝŶŽŝƐZĂƉĞDǇƚŚ
Acceptance Scale and the Bystander Attitude Scale. 
59 As for Edina, it could be claimed that being unable to speak a testimony is a 
harm in itself. Also consider that allowing a rapist to get away with his actions 
and target future victims is uncontroversially a harm.  
60 Lackie and de Man interviewed 86 men, assessing what factors affected their 
likelihood of sexual aggression.  
61 Ferraro (1996) conducted 1,101 telephone interviews and found that women 
are much more afraid of violence than men are, and the difference is particularly 
strong with sexual violence.  
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 “ďĂĚ ? ?Ƶƌƚ1978, 301 W302), a victim may choose not to report her experience 
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ “people will think [she is] responsible ?62 (Jones et al. 2009, 420), with 
her awareness of the former myth affecting this decision. The worry that people 
will think the women are responsible could be informed by many similar rape 
myths. For example, 71% of people believe that  “some women unconsciously 
want to be raped and may unconsciously bring the rape upon themselves, ? 33% 
believe hitchhikers deserve to be raped, and 48% believe that women wearing 
revealing clŽƚŚŝŶŐĂƌĞ “ĂƐŬŝŶŐĨŽƌƚƌŽƵďůĞ ? ?Ƶƌƚ1978, 301 W302). The myths that 
women lie about rape to  “get back at ? men and that they falsely report rape for 
attention ? believed by 53% and 41% of people, respectively (Burt 1978, 301 W
302) ?ŵĂǇďŽƚŚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂǁŽŵĂŶ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŶŽƚƚŽƌĞƉŽƌƚon the entirely 
plausible belief ƚŚĂƚ “ƉĞŽƉůĞǁŝůůŶŽƚďĞůŝĞǀĞ[them] ?(Jones et al. 2009, 420): 
Forty-nine percent of women did not report sexual assault for this reason (Jones 
et al. 2009, 420). 
These figures demonstrate that where a man possesses pernicious 
ignorance by accepting rape myths, a woman may read this testimonial 
incompetence and choose not to report sexual assault for that reason. As before, 
the content of the rape myth accepted by a man need not directly correlate to a 
ǁŽŵĂŶ ?ƐƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌŶŽƚƌĞƉŽƌƚŝŶŐ; the examples where they do correlate just 
illustrate the connection nicely, and give cases where the link will be particularly 
strong. Recalling case (D), imagine Jesse was wearing a short skirt when she was 
raped, but she wants to report the crime. Jesse may suspect that the police 
officer accepts the rape myth that women dressed revealingly ĂƌĞ “ĂƐŬŝŶŐĨŽƌ
trouble, ? so she chooses not to report the ƌĂƉĞďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞĨĞĂƌƚŚĂƚ “Ɖeople 
will think [she is] resƉŽŶƐŝďůĞ ? ?In this case the testimonial incompetence Jesse 
perceives, resulting from pernicious ignorance, prevents her from speaking a 
ƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇƚŚĂƚĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƌŝƐŬǇ ?dŚĂƚƌĂƉĞŵǇƚŚŚĂƐƐŝůĞŶĐĞĚ:ĞƐƐĞ ?ƐƌĞƉŽƌƚ ?ŝŶĂ
ŵĂŶŶĞƌƚŚĂƚĨŝƚƐŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐŵŽĚĞůŽĨƚĞƐƚŝŵonial smothering.  
In cases like (C) and (D) women experience testimonial smothering of 
reporting sexual assault, and provided it is also the case (as I argued at the end of 
ƉĂƌƚ ? ?ƚŚĂƚƚŽĚĂǇ ?ƐƉŽƌŶŽŐƌĂƉŚǇŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƐĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞŽĨƌĂƉĞŵǇƚŚƐ, 
pornography can contribute to the pernicious ignorance involved. 
 
Conclusions 
I have defended the claim that an account of pornography silencing 
women can ǁŽƌŬǁŚĞŶŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚďǇŽƚƐŽŶ ?Ɛaccount of testimonial smothering. 
                                                          
62 Seventy-three percent of women did not report sexual assault for that reason 
(Jones et al. 2009, 420). This figure should be taken with a grain of salt; I suspect 
ƚŚĞĐŽƌƌĞĐƚĨŝŐƵƌĞǁŽƵůĚďĞŚŝŐŚĞƌ ?ďƵƚ:ŽŶĞƐĞƚĂů ? ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇŝƐƐĞǀĞƌĞůǇůŝŵŝƚĞĚďǇ
ruling out women who had been drinking when they had been assaulted, women 
who did not want a vaginal examination, and women who did not speak good 
English.  
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In part 1, I introduced two very common ways in which women fail to 
speak: women not refusing ? and consenting to ? sex that they do not want, and 
women not reporting rape and sexual assault.  
In part 2, /ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨƐŝůĞŶĐŝŶŐĂŶĚĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚŚŽǁ
testimonial smothering works: a speaker suspects their audience possesses 
ƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶŝĂůŝŶĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƉĞĂŬĞƌ ?ƐƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ
chooses not to speak it at all. I explained testimonial incompetence and how this 
can be rooted in pernicious ignorance.  
In part 3, I gave two examples of women not refusing unwanted sex and 
demonstrated that they meeƚŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶŝĂůƐŵŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ? I 
argued that refusing sex is risky, and that choosing not to refuse sex out of fear 
or out of a sense of duty counts as testimonial smothering where the choice not 
to speak is informed by the perceived testimonial incompetence and pernicious 
ignorance of the hearer. Additionally, I argued that rape myths are a species of 
pernicious ignorance, so a hearer of refusal of sex may possess pernicious 
ignorance in two ways: by believing rape myths, and by possessing situated 
ignorance. I ended the section by demonstrating that pornography contributes 
to the silenced refusal of sex by affecting ŵĞŶ ?ƐĂĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞŽĨrape myths.  
In part 4, I showed that women not reporting sexual assault also meets 
ŽƚƐŽŶ ?ƐĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶŝĂůƐŵŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚĐŽƵŶƚs as silencing on that 
model. I illustrated that women may find reporting sexual assault risky because 
they may receive more violence and be treated as lying or blameworthy. I 
showed that police officers, partners, and other hearers often possess 
testimonial incompetence, and this may prevent a woman from speaking her 
testimony. I again posited that this testimonial incompetence can be attributed 
to two kinds of pernicious ignorance: rape myths and situated ignorance. Finally, 
I argued that as pornography increased rape myth acceptance in men, 
pornography can be seen as contributing to the silencing of women who are 
forced to silence their reports of sexual assault.  
In sum, I suggest that ŽƚƐŽŶ ?Ɛaccount of testimonial smothering 
provides a way in which pornography contributes to the silencing of women, by 
silencing their refusal of sex and their reports of sexual assault.  
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